2007/IX/21 PNV, SHAKED BY SUBMISSIVENESS AND DESAGREEMENTS
Independentzia eta Sozialismorantz
EUSKAL HERRIA, STEP BY STEP
ASKAPENA's information service Nş 189
A negotiation process always means that the ones involved in it should take risks. If the process works, each part should explain to their own people the cessions that have made. If the process fails, each part would try to pay the less possible. Obviously, the risk taken by the weaker part are bigger because for them is more difficult to explain their point of view about what happened.
Regarding the failed Basque process, the Spanish government had more chances of minimizing the costs of a breaking-off. In addition of the huge State apparatus resources, they had an ally that had an important value due to their servile attitude: the Basque Nationalist Party, PNV.
In this video the ex-president of the PNV speaks aboat making agreements for the goverment with the spanish unionist-facist PP, and after Arnaldo Otegi (one of the basque left's leaders, in prison nowadays) speaks aboat that.
During the process, the one who could have been an interlocutor plays the role of collaborator
Obviously, PNV should be at the negotiating table because they represent in the Basque Autonomy an important part of the Basque people. But the attitude this party was going to adopt was not that obvious. They forgot their Basque roots and took part besides the Spanish government; they forgot their nationalist identity and supported the State position that denies us our sovereignty. The renounced the changes in the ongoing frame and defended the Autonomic model, which is very the root of the conflict. Altogether with the Spanish government, they put forward "peace for prisoners", to dissociate pacification from political normalization, to introduce little cosmetic changes in order that the Basque country remains a province of Spain, and besides supported by Basque people.
PNV supported so much the Spanish thesis that in the last talk sessions Batasuna vetoed their presence at the table because the only thing PNV was doing was to support the Spanish state interest (very well defended by the State itself), forgetting of the Basque people's ones.
PNV had another reason to block the negotiated solution: if the negotiating table would have reach an agreement to change the political frame, this would have meant that the bet on the autonomic frame the PNV made 30 years ago was a mistake. This would also have meant that the Basque left (whom PNV always denies any political entity) had defended better than them the Basque people interest. If the process would have success, the PNV future would have been doubtful. This was one of the reasons why PNV boycotted the process.
Once the process broken, they become their master's voice
Once the process failed, the negotiating parts have to tackle with one of the most delicate task: to explain to the society the reasons of this failure, and to try to minimize the cost of it.
Batasuna and ETA, each one by different ways, have explained their opinion about what happened. The political organization as well as the armed one considered that they had to completely involve themselves in the process in order to try to find a definitive solution. Batasuna accepted the requirement of becoming a political force, they accepted an autonomic structure for the South of the Basque country as a transitory situation to move forward the unity of the territory (they propose another autonomy for the North of the country), they demanded the right to decide for the Basque society, adapting it to the timing in each territory. Regarding ETA, they reiterated that their truce was a firm step, that the Barajas attack was only but a repulsive aiming to re-channel the process, and they said that they were prepared to dismantle their military structure if the respect for the people's will was guaranteed. Both organizations blame the failure on the Spanish government, who do not want to tackle the roots of the conflict, and only look for ETA's surrender. They also consider PNV responsible for what happened.
The PNV backed wholeheartedly the government's version: 'ETA do not really want peace', 'they do not respect the truce', 'they tried to blackmail so that the interlocutors negotiated under threat'... The PNV also reproduced government's messages regarding Batasuna: 'Batasuna is not independent from ETA'; 'they just changed the name in order to attend the elections but they did change their ideas and did not condemn violence', 'they changed some agreements already made under ETA's pressure'... PNV's work after the process was devastating and it was also extremely valuable for Madrid: they absolved free Madrid of all responsibility and spread the idea that it was the fanatism of the left that broke the process... Their defense of Madrid was so exaggerated that was ridiculous: at the end the PSOE themselves accepted what PNV denied, that they said 'no' to every proposal made by the left.
In the post-process phase, they work as mercenaries
PNV's servitude continues during the post-process phase: as the left did not surrender it becomes necessary to discredit them, to put the blame on them, and finally, to thrash them. It is in this context that must be understand the brutal assault against the relatives and friends of the prisoner made by the PNV police on September 9 in Donosti. This demonstration asking amnesty and self-determination takes place every year since 30 years ago; it was first forbidden and after repress by PNV police. The indiscriminate shots, the injured, the imprisonment of an important leader are testifying the baseness of this party.
They tauten the rope so much that at the end was broken
The deep disagreements inside PNV were evident. But all agree on the main thing: to win the elections, to control the institutions, and to politically annihilate the left. They disagree about the strategy. The more pro-Basque sector inside PNV want to neutralize the left snatching them some of their claims, and having differences from Madrid. The more pro-Spain sector (whose leader is the ex- President of PNV, Iosu Ion Imaz) think that the accurate strategy is to ally with the Spanish government in order to strength the repressive policy against the left. This is the sector that led the acts we described in the paragraphs above and that deserved praises form the Spanish government. The other sector thought that this strategy damages the party: it makes too clear the party's 'pragmatism' (servility).
This second sector prevailed, because the first one caused rejection, even inside the PNV. The President of the party, the one who more strongly defended their subjection to Madrid, was compelled to resign. Once the ballast dropped, would the PNV assume the sovereignty strategy? History shows us that the answer is no.
