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FROM THE WORLD TO THE BASQUE COUNTRY


 
Who are we? From EH to the World Step by Step Brigades I. Conference Opinion

2007/XI/02
The proposal of the basque self-governing region president: the context of the text(I)

Tasio Independentzia eta Sozialismorantz
EUSKAL HERRIA, PASO A PASO
Servicio informativo de ASKAPENA, Nş 195

In a clear pre-elections atmosphere, Ibarretxe (the President of the basque self-governing region) presents his "road map" to "overcome the conflict". Is it real? Does it really try to overcome the conflict? Which is its background? Which is the stance of the different political agents regarding to it?

On September 28, in a plenary session of the the Basque self-governing Parliament (formed by just 3 of the 7 provinces of the Basque Country), started the new political year in the Basque Country. In this session President Ibarretxe, officialy presented his proposal to guarantee the coexistence of the Basque Country and the Spanish state, his own "road map" that sould lead to overcome the conflict.


Fernando Barrena on Ibarretxe's initiative.

New context for an old proposal: after the failure of negotiations

The proposal was already announced before the plenary session on Spetember 28. It was not a new one, as it was a copy of the "Ibarretxe Plan" aproved by the Self-governing Parliament by absolute majority on December 2004. Later, on Febraury 2005, Ibarretxe himself defended before the Spanish Parliament, where he founded a direct rejection. So the proposal is not new, but the context is new. The talks between ETA and the Spanish government on one hand, and among the Basque parties, on the other, ended on May after failing. ETA resumed the armed fight (the Spanish state was never in truce), and the Spanish state undetook a mass persecution against the activist of the Basque left. This new scenario increases the tension, and reduces the expectations of a big part of the society. President Ibarretxe considers it is a good moment to burst in the political esphere promising what ETA and Batasuna could not acheive: he promises that he will be able to seal an agreement to solve the conflict with the state. Such a promissing offer could seduce a desillusioned population. The PNV is now tyring to recover the prominence that during the two years of talks had become weak as the Basque left had become a preferential interlocutor for the Spanish government.

Elections in view. Two opposed electoral strategys

Next general elections in the Spanish state that will be held on march 2008 are extremely important to understand the context of this proposal made by Ibarretxe. The results of the municipal elections held on May 2007 were very bad for the PNV, so now they have to improve their strategy in order to avoid another failure in the 2008 elections. It is quite clear inside the party the aim of recovering the lost support of the society, but they do not agree about the strategy to do so: a big sector of the PNV (among them, the ex-President of PNV, Imaz) consider that the way is to reach an agreement with the Spanish goverment, and therefore the PNV would be a reliable interlocutor. Another sector, the one of President Ibarretxe, belive that the aim is to recover the leadership by claiming sovereignity and the righ to decide. This strategy snatchs from the Basque left the ideas that they have always defend, and also turns the PNV into the only strong reference, into the leader of all the sectors that defend a deep change to get sovereignity.
Does it mean that a sector of PNV defends sovereignity, and the other the integration into Spain? There are no reasons to belive so as the PNV policy has always been pro-Spain. Nevertheless, both strategys are incompatible, but they are coincident in the final aim. The one defended by Imaz bets on reducing the confrontation with the Spanish state trying to seduce it with good manners and a servile attitude. Ibarretxe's one bets on assuming the verbal confrontation with the State, on begining by claiming some nationalist demands, on cheching Zapatero in order to see how large is his so-called willingness to negotiate, on making him a more easily aceptable proposal than the one made by Batasuna, and force Zapatero to define his position. This apparently more honorable style would turn Ibarretxe into the sovereignity referent, and would give him a large social support in next elections. And then? Once reached the electoral support, a negotiation with Spain similar to the one supported by Imaz would start. Ibarretxe would also open a negotiation with the state, but presenting himself as the winner of the electios, and with more social support. Ibarretxe do not want to seduce Spain, but to sweet-talk the Basque society, and then use the support he would get as a result of the elections.
The incompatibility between both strategys caused so important tensions inside PNV that the President of the party, Imaz, had to resign as the other strategy wins.
The same confrontation appeared inside Nafarroa Bai, a "branch" organized by PNV in Nafarroa with the aim of weakening the leadership the Basque left had in Nafarroa. One of the parties belonging to the coalition Nafarroa Bai, Batzarre (the most pro-Spain and "leftish" wing) chose Imaz's strategy, and the rest of the forces that belong to the coalition chose Ibarrtexe's one. The confrontation between both strategys also broke the unity of this coalition, whose cohesion was not at its best.
We have also to take the pre-elections context outside PNV into account. After the failed talks, PSOE can not afford a new try six months before the general elections. PP had hardly attacked the PSEO's try to have talks with Batasuna, and they would attack PSOE again if they do the same with PNV. PP's strategy has produced results as the pre-elections polls show that PP is on a level with PSOE. This party tries to get ahead of PP by boasting about being stronger against the Basque people that the PP itself, with Aznar and Rajoy. From the point of view electoral, the proposal of a new agreement is extremely inopportune and counterproductive. The more strong Zapatero will be regarding Ibarretxe's proposal, the better the electoral results will be for him. Why did Ibarretxe choose this very moment? Because the same happend with him: the more strong he will be regarding Spain, the better the electoral result will be for him.


A great deal of interest in the media

Ibarretxe tries to reach one of the inmediate aims: to become a necessary reference in the national and international political scenario. He has travelled to different countries to explain himself his proposal. The media that are under his control have covered everyday the tour. He has provoked a important debate inside the Basque society, and also a big interest amond ther Basque Diaspora. And from the very moment it was made, the proposal provokes a negative reaction from the Spanish state; the harder ones go until to propose that the self-governing region shoul be suspend, as Blair did in Ireland. And if it were necessary, to send the army...
The less belligerent propose that the State should talk with Ibarretxe, but just to tell him, loud and clear, that his proposal is unfeasible, and that the only thing to do is to accept the Spanish Constitution as the frame of any relationship. Any initiative that sholud be outside of the Constitution frame would be illegal.
In the meantime, the Basque left is repressed, imprisoned, and criminalized. It is not sure if they could attend next elections, and they are not allow to do a political work. Is it possible to reach a solution excluding an important part of the society?

Euskal Herria, October 29, 2007.

 
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